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"THE APPEAL" TO THE MASSES
PENNY J. WHITEt
INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, dozens of legal scholars have written to decry the politicalization of state court judiciaries.' The decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 2 only increased the concern and the
opportunity, by creating an environment ripe for control by moneyed
interests. But largely we have been talking to ourselves, sharing pages in
law review symposia and meeting in law school classrooms to lament the
threats to judicial independence and, occasionally, to propose reform.

t
E.E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law Director, Center for Advocacy and Dispute
Resolution University of Tennessee College of Law. Professor White has served as a state intermediate appellate judge and a supreme court justice.
I appreciate being invited by the Denver University Law Review to contribute to this issue
and being allowed to do so in a nontraditional format. I also want to thank several people who
helped on this Essay. First, I want to thank Professor Judy Cornett who encouraged me and answered many questions; second, I want to thank Mike Okun, who provided excellent ideas and
valuable internet research. I am most appreciative to Norene Napper and Patricia Graves, exceptionally talented students at the University of Tennessee College of Law, who followed every research
lead I suggested and inspired me with their interest and enthusiasm, and to Chip Howorth and Mark
Ensley who aided us in our work.
1. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Keynote Address, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 9-10 (2003); Lawrence Baum, Judicial
Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter's Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 13 (2003);
James J Brudney & Lawrence A. Baum, Foreword to Symposium, Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1 (2003); Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by "JudicialIndependence?," 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 324 (2003); Kevin S. Burke, A Judiciary That Is as Good as Its
Promise: The Best Strategy for PreservingJudicial Independence, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 4, 5;
Kevin S. Burke, The Tyranny of the 'Or' Is the Threat to Judicial Independence, Not ProblemSolving Courts, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 32, 32; Harry L. Carrico, Call to Arms: The Need to
Protect the Independence of the Judiciary, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 575, 576 (2004); Michael G.
Collins, JudicialIndependence and the Scope of Article III-A View from the Federalist,38 U. RICH.
L. REV. 675, 677-78 (2004); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 43, 49-50 (2003); Lawrence G. Myers, JudicialIndependence in the Municipal Court: Preliminary Observationsfrom Missouri, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 26, 26; D. Dudley Oldham & Seth S.
Andersen, Commentary, Role of the Organized Bar in Promoting an Independent and Accountable
Judiciary, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 341, 342 (2003); Thomas R. Phillips, Keynote Address, Electoral Accountability and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 138 (2003); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Three Independences, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 603 (2004); William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 579 (2004); Jeffrey Rosinek, Some Thoughts on the Problems of
Judicial Elections, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 20, 20; John Russonello, Speak to Values: How to
Promote the Courts and Blunt Attacks on Judiciary, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 10, 10; Roy Schotland, Resource Materials on Judicial Independence, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 38, 38; Rodney A.
Smolla, ChiefJustice Harry L Carricoand the Ideal of JudicialIndependence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
571, 571 (2004); Kenneth W. Starr, Legislative Restraint in the Confirmation Process, 38 U. RICH.
L. REV. 597,598 (2004).
2. 536 U.S. 765, 777-78 (2002).
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After giving dozens of lectures and writing several articles on the
topic of judicial independence, I, too, began to feel like a doomsday predictor, or at least like Henny Penny in the story of Chicken Little. 3 Often, I struggled when it was suggested that I should end an address on a
high note, unsure whether I could, in good conscience, reach one. Because I felt that my message was stale and dispiriting, I was hesitant
when Denver University Law Review editor Forrest Plesko asked me to
contribute to this issue. Within a few weeks, as a matter of pure coincidence,4 I listened to John Grisham's book The Appeal5 during a lengthy
road trip. I realized immediately that John Grisham may have done what
none of us could do: through the medium of literature, he has told the
story of what is happening in our state courts to a heretofore-unreached,
but indispensable-to-any-solution, audience-the American public.
A detached reader's first reaction might be that The Appeal tells a
pretty good story, but that it is only a story. This essay tests the reader's
likely reaction by contrasting some 6 of the imaginary, 7 and perhaps outlandish, facts of Grisham's book with what is actually happening in state
judicial elections. Its goal is to chronicle the present condition of state
court judicial selection.

3.
The story of Chicken Little, who first alerts Henny Penny that "the sky is falling" before
the two set off a flurry of panic, dates to the Jataka Tales of Buddhist Indian folklore, but was made
popular in modem times by the Australian author Joseph Jacobs in his book Henny Penny. My
previous expressions of woe about the demise of judicial independence include the following:
Penny J. White, A Matter of Perspective, 3 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 5, 7-8 (2004); Penny J.
White, If Justice is for all, who are its Constituents?, 64 TENN. L. REV. 259, 260 (1997); Penny J.
White, "It's a Wonderful Life," or is it? America Without Judicial Independence, 27 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1, 1-2 (1996), as reprinted in 80 JUDICATURE 174, 174 (1997); Penny J. White, Judging
Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by use of JudicialPerformance Evaluations, 24 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1053, 1056 (2002); Penny J. White, Preserving the Legacy: A Tribute to Chief Justice
Harry L Carrico,one who Exalted JudicialIndependence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 615-16 (2004);
Penny J. White, "The Good, the Bad, and the [Very, Very] Ugly" and (its Postscript), "A Fistful of
Dollars:" Musings on White, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 626, 627 (2004); Penny J. White, The Aftermath
of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 1 (July, 14, 2007) (unpublished article, on file with the
Pound Foundation).
4.
The choice of The Appeal was not completely accidental. Judge Mary Anne Majestic,
Tempe, Arizona, prompted my taking the time to listen to the book, and I thank her for that.
5.

JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008) [hereinafter THE APPEAL].

6.
Because of time constraints and page limitations, I address only a very few of the assertions in Grisham's books, having to give short shrift or totally omit many, equally interesting others,
such as employing wedge issues to get out the vote in otherwise low turnout judicial races; using
decoy, colorful candidates to gain public attention; developing intelligence on the personal lives of
incumbents; employing scare tactics and voting tariffs to deter certain voters; and involving federal
office holders with established political allies.
7.
The author assures the reader in his Author's Note that "[a]ny similarity to a real person is
coincidental." GRISHAM, supra note 5, at 357.
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I. GRISHAM, THE AUTHOR
"[O]utlandish"; "preposterous"; 9 "hallucinatory"; 1°' [s]pell-binding
hyperbole";" "healthy dose of exaggeration and falsehood";1 2 and "baloney of biased rhetoric."' 3 These are but a few of the words and phrases
that have been used to describe John Grisham's novels. The descriptions
may well be good fits for many of Grisham's plots and characters. The
Firm's story about Mitch McDeere-a 25-year old Harvard graduate,
who stumbles into employment with a law firm that works round-theclock for visible clients while laundering money in the back offices for
the Mafial 4-is a bit surreal. The same characterization applies to the
Sullivan law firm in A Time to Kill as a law firm that "every lawyer detested."' 5 Similarly, the depiction of Hemba and Hamilton-the "trusty
lawyers" in The Testament who use "lobbyists for legal bribery to land
fat government contracts and hide money in Swiss accounts" 16 and also
use prosecutors who forsake the obligations of their office in order to
align themselves for higher officel'-is at least inordinately jaded.
Moreover, Grisham's exaggerations do not end with the lawyers in his
books. He writes about judges who, while incarcerated, blackmail gay
men by threatening to expose their sexuality,1 8 as well as judges who
conspire with defense counsel to force plaintiffs to settle lawsuits. 19
8

Grisham's critics claim that his writings are agitprop,20 that he uniformly views the legal system with a "jaundiced eye ' 2' always favoring
the little guy 22 and that the system he portrays is always corrupt and
perverted, based on a "cynical premise. ''23 Still, others see Grisham as
8.
David Germain, Adaptation of Grisham Courtroom Thriller is "Outlandish Story,"
CANARSIE COURIER, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.canarsiecourier.comINews/2003/1030/
ArtsEntertainment/024.html.
Id.; Marilyn Stasio, Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991, at BR37.
9.
10.
Review of THE FIRM, http://www.amazon.co.uk/Firm-John-Grishamldp/0099830000
("Hallucinatory [E]ntertainment ... Terrifically [E]xciting... [Glrips and [Piropels.") (last visited
Oct. 31, 2008).
11.
Review of THE APPEAL, http://www.amazon.comgp/pdp/profile/A36LKTTFZJ3VI9 (last
visited Nov. 10, 2008).
Interview by SlushPile.net with John Grisham, Author (Mar. 1, 2006),
12.
http://www.slushpile.net/index.php/2006/03/01/interview-john-grisham-author/.
Janet Maslin, Book Review, If You Can't Win the Case, Buy the Election and Get Your
13.
Own Judge, NY TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008.
14.
See JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM (1991).
15.
See JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME TO KILL 27 (1989).
See JOHN GRISHAM, THE TESTAMENT 265 (1999).
16.
17.
See JOHN GRISHA , A TIME TO KILL 101 (1989); JOHN GRISHAM, THE CLIENT 120-21
(1993).
18. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE BRETHREN (2000).
See JOHN GRiSHAM, THE RAINMAKER 195-97 (2000).
19.
20. Timothy Rutten, Book Review, Deft Social Realism and Iffy Grammar, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2008 at El.
21.
John B. Owens, Grisham's Legal Tales: A Moral Compass for. the Young Lawyer, 48
UCLA L. REv. 1431, 1434 (2001).
22. Id. at 1435-38.
Stasio, supra note 9.
23.
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a mirror to our age,
"holding
and beingup
"deadly
accurate."
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painting a "sadly familiar picture, ' 25

II. BACKGROUND: THEAPPEAL

Drawing on a familiar formula, The Appeal includes bad rich guys
and good poor guys and gals, a Faustian challenge, and an ending that

brings a glimmer of hope. But is The Appeal just another "depressingly
fascinating" 26 Grisham tale? Or does it contain elements of reality,
an
27
expos6 of the effect of real world politics on state judicial systems?
The Appeal traces a fictitious toxic tort case, Baker v. Krane Chemical,28 from jury verdict until the case's conclusion in the Mississippi Su-

preme Court.29 A Mississippi jury finds that Krane contaminated the
groundwater in Bowmore causing the cancerous death of Jeanette
Baker's husband and son and awards Mrs. Baker $41 million dollars in
compensatory and punitive damages. 3° This verdict sets off a chain reaction, bankrupting Mrs. Baker's lawyers (the good guy and gal husbandand-wife law firm of Wes and Mary Grace Payton),3 1 making Krane's
CEO (bad guy Carl Trudeau) an even wealthier man,32 and landing an
unknown, undistinguished lawyer (foil family-value conservative Ron
Fisk) on the Mississippi Supreme Court3 3 in the place of an incumbent

24. Chuck Leddy, Grisham Provides a Shock to the System, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2008,
available
at
http://www.boston.conmae/books/articles/2008/01/26/grisham-provides-a-shockto_the-system/.
25. Id.
26. Peter Guttridge, Evil Comes in Many Guises, THE OBSERVER, Feb. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/feb/03/stephenking.fiction.
27. See Carol Memmott, Grisham's 'Appeal' Rules Harshly on Bought Elections, USA
TODAY, Jan. 30, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/books/reviews/2008-01-28grisham-appealN.htm.
28. THE APPEAL, supra note 5,Author's Note. Grisham describes the characters as "purely
fictional"; the town, county, company, products, and chemicals as nonexistent; the justices, organizations, churches, corporations, and think tanks as not real; the campaign as a "figment of [his]
imagination"; some of the laws as "butchered"; and the lawsuit as "borrowed from several actual
cases" but adds that "there is a lot of truth in this story."
29. THE APPEAL, supra note 5.
30. Id.at1-13.
31.
Id.at245-46. The members of the Payton firm hold hands and pray "as they had never
prayed before" when they learn that the jury has reached a verdict. Id.at5 ("Please, dear Lord ...
grant us a divine victory. And deliver us from humiliation, ruin, bankruptcy, and a host of other
evils that a bad verdict will bring."). By contrast, Krane's lawyer awaited the verdict "reading a
biography and watching the hours pass at $750 per" and "marched away without comment, without
prayer." Id.
32. Id.at352-55. In true Grisham style, a side story emerges in which Trudeau, while fighting the verdict with his government-relations consulting firm, manages to buy very low and sell very
high. After acquiring almost all of Krane stock when the prices were deflated, by virtue of the news
surrounding the verdict and other pending toxic tort lawsuits, Trudeau, through his lawyer mouthpieces, bolsters the stock price by rumors about settlement negotiations, and then instructs counsel to
withdraw from negotiations. Id.at 272-89.
33. Id.at 105-109, 300-01.
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justice (partial protagonist Sheila McCarthy, female, divorced, qualified,
experienced, but naive and unsuspecting).3 4
From the very beginning, Grisham makes it clear that Krane and
Trudeau are pure antagonists, bad to the core. Krane intentionally dumps
toxic waste, contaminating Bowmore's ground water; 35 Trudeau uses
bribes and well-placed connections to dupe the government. 36 For years,
residents of Bowmore complain about suspect water, both to the factory
and to the government, but are constantly reassured that it is safe.37
When unusually high rates of cancer strike Bowmore, the Paytons-the
story's absolute protagonists-are the only lawyers with the nerve to
fight Krane and the stomach to acquire the debt necessary to do so, 38 thus
making the large jury verdict even sweeter.
The verdict in favor of Baker enrages Trudeau, who vows to win on
appeal,39 and is aided in his effort by a friendly United States Senator
who calls Trudeau to suggest that with the help of Barry Rinehart-"[a
lawyer who is] extremely competent, smart, discreet, successful, and
expensive," but not in the phone book,40 and who is protagonist number
two-the verdict can be "fix[ed]. '41 Rinehart, a nefarious "consultant of
sorts," "specializes in elections" 42 and can assure Krane's victory on appeal if Trudeau will provide the cash to "restructure[] the Mississippi
Supreme Court. ' 4 3 "For eight million [dollars]," Trudeau "can buy
[him] self a supreme court justice." 44
Trudeau would not "buy" a sitting justice outright. Instead,
Rinehart would use his money to take a "not particularly friendly" incumbent justice "out of the picture. ' 45 Rinehart targets a moderate female justice, Sheila McCarthy, and selects as the unsuspecting prot6g6 an
inexperienced and unbaggaged 6 lawyer named Ron Fisk, 47 whose back-

34. Id. at 116-20, 188-190.
35.
Id. at 10-12, 17-18, 20-24.
36. Id. at 139-40.
37.
Id. at 20-24.
38.
Id. at 8. A side plot in Grisham's story involves the plaintiffs firm teetering on financial
disaster. In the end the antagonist controls the banks too, calling the loans, and forcing the firm into
almost certain bankruptcy.
39. Id. at 31. Within minutes of the verdict, Trudeau is assured by his lawyers that "'[i]t'll be
years before a dime changes hands, if, in fact, that ever happens,"' prompting Trudeau to swear "'it
will never happen. Not one dime of our hard-earned profits will ever get into the hands of those
trailer park peasants."' Id. at 18. Hours later, Trudeau boasted to "number 228 on the Forbes list of
the 400 richest Americans," "'[w]e'll never pay a dime."' Id. at 31.
40. Id. at 68.
41.
Id. at 68-69.
42. Id. at 68, 81-82.
43. Id. at 84.
44. Id. at 85.
45. Id. at 83.
46. Id. at 106. "The Fisks were squeaky-clean. There was nothing to dig up in the heat of a
nasty campaign."
47. Id. at 105.

256
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ground is conducive to the pro-business and socially conservative campaign that Rinehart calculates will win the election.48 After meetings
with politicians and special interest groups, Fisk, unknowingly at first,49
becomes the face of the operation "to convert Sheila McCarthy from the
sensible moderate she was into the raging liberal [the opposition] needed
her to be." 5°
As plaintiffs' lawyers descend on Bowmore to ride the coattails of
the Baker victory, and the Paytons struggle to avoid bankruptcy while
litigating the appeal, Rinehart's company takes full advantage of the
plodding appellate timeline and the emotional barometers of conservative
special interest groups. 5' Rinehart wrangles and masks massive contributions from business and special interests using shadow groups to funnel illegal campaign funds.52 Having coerced politicians and government
officials with a mixture of duplicity and bribery to gain a financial and
political advantage, Rinehart then employs wedge issues to both distract
and ignite voters. He enlists a diversion candidate to stoke the death
penalty debate, manufactures a gay marriage crisis in rural Mississippi,
and overwhelms the public with a barrage of advertisements that distort
53 What begins with Fisk's "soft ads ' 54
McCarthy's moderate record.
quickly evolves into a "blitzkrieg campaign, 55 accusing McCarthy of

Young white male, one marriage, three children, reasonably handsome, reasonably well
dressed, conservative, devout Baptist, Ole Miss law school, no ethical glitches in the law
career, not a hint of criminal trouble beyond a speeding ticket, no affiliation with any trial
lawyer group, no controversial cases, no experience whatsoever on the bench.
There was no reason anyone outside of Brookhaven would ever have heard the name of
Ron Fisk, and that was exactly what made him their ideal candidate. They picked Fisk
because he was just old enough to cross their low threshold of legal experience, but still
young enough to have ambitions.
48. Id. at 107. "Judicial Vision," Rinehart's organizational faqade has as its "sole purpose"
the election of "quality people to the appellate courts." Id. Quality people are:
•. . conservative, business oriented, temperate, highly moral, intelligent, and ambitious
young judges who can literally ... change the judicial landscape of this country .... [in-

cluding] protect[ing] the rights of the
consumed by . . . children, honor[ing]
out of [the] classrooms, fight[ing] off
and protect[ing] the true American way

unborn, restrict[ing] the cultural garbage that is
the sanctity of marriage, keep[ing] homosexuals
the gun-control advocates, seal[ing] our borders,
of fife.

Id.
49.
See id.
50. Id. at 190.
51.
See id. at 208-09. For good measure, the group plants two gay men in Jackson, Mississippi, who try to marry, and then file a lawsuit when they are denied a license. Their appeal meanders alongside of the Baker appeal in the Mississippi courts. Id.
52. Id. at 213.
53.
Id. at 222-24.
54. Id. at 190. The soft ads featured plays to patriotism and family heritage and featured
family values such as hard work and the pursuit of the truth. Id. They included "friendly stuff...
Rotary Club, Boy Scouts." Id. at I11.
55. Id. at 110. Rinehart's operative describes a blitzkrieg campaign as: "basically an ambush.
Right now Judge McCarthy has no idea she has an opponent ....She has six thousand bucks in her
campaign account ....[Wle'll wait until the last minute to announce your candidacy ....She will
be overwhelmed from the first day." Id. at 110-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on crime[, s]oft on gays[, s]oft on guns[, a]gainst the death
being "soft
56
penalty."
Taken largely by surprise, Justice McCarthy struggles to assemble
her own campaign with few resources. She garners the support of the
struggling plaintiffs' bar, which enables Rinehart to foster the stereotypical business versus trial lawyers debate over consumer protection and
frivolous lawsuits. In the end, McCarthy loses and Fisk is elected 57 just
in time to hear the Baker appeal and make good on his campaign platform of limiting liability and reversing punitive damages awards.58 The
dead and dying in Bowmore receive nothing, and Krane stock "roar[s] to
life," as Trudeau "sip[s] Cristal champagne, smoke[s] Cuban cigars," and
celebrates the realization of his vow that "[n]ot one dime ... would ever
be handed over to those ignorant people and their slimy lawyers. 59
Through constant inference and occasional explicit expression,
Grisham uses the setting, plot, and characters to push a frightening
theme: state appellate judges and ultimately the courts on which they
serve are manipulated and controlled by moneyed special interest
groups. 6° From start to finish, Grisham asserts what some might consider
fanciful facts to enhance the story: special interest groups and wealthy
businesses target sitting judges for removal; they select inexperienced,
pliable greenhorns to run for judicial office and spend millions of dollars
from unrevealed sources getting them elected; they run rank campaigns
demonizing incumbent judges and creating expectations of how the challenger will rule, to which the new judge succumbs once in office. Widespread voter apathy and poor citizen erudition simplify the take-over
while complicating the targeted judge's ability to respond and react.
The truly disturbing nature of Grisham's plot as well as the vile nature of the characters leaves one to contemplate to what extent the story
is simply artifice at work. Has Grisham spun another entertaining tale
which is pure fiction, or has he used the story as a medium to warn
against a frightening reality?

56.
57.

Id. at 111.
Id. at 301.

58.
Id. at 347. Grisham prolongs the inevitable, pausing for Fisk's son to suffer a catastrophic
injury caused by a "defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous" aluminum baseball bat and
exacerbated by a sloppy emergency room doctor. Id. at 328-29, 340-41. Fisk has to confront the
Ron Fisk he has become, a man who "can't sue" (despite his doctor's indictment that the emergency
room doctor committed "gross negligence") because to do so would "make a mockery" out of himself. Id. at 341. Despite his "true feelings," described as "changing," Fisk votes to reverse the Baker
verdict rather than "betray those who had elected him." Id. at 347.
Id. at 350-51.
59.
60.
In his Author's Notes, Grisham describes the theme more benignly: "[als long as private
money is allowed in judicial elections we will see competing interests fight for seats on the bench."
Id. at357, 358.
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III. REALITY OR PURE FICTION: TESTING SOME ASSERTIONS IN THE
APPEAL

A. Targeting Sitting Justicesfor Removal: Reality or Pure Fiction?
1. Targeting Sitting Justices
Rinehart to Trudeau: "We do campaigns.... When our clients need
help, we target a supreme court justice who is not particularly
friendly, and we take him, or her, out of the picture." 61
Senator to Fisk: "This gal, McCarthy . . . [has] never been on
plus, between us boys, she just ain't cut
board... She's too liberal,
62
outfor the black robe."
Rinehart's Agent to Fisk: "Sitting judges make tough decisions....
63
They leave trails, records that opponents can use againstthem."

Test the assertion that appellate judges are targeted for removal on
sitting Justice Carol Hunstein of Georgia, or former Justices Louis Butler
of Wisconsin, Warren McGraw of West Virginia, or Chuck McRae of
Mississippi. They likely will all agree that the assertion is not fictitious
but a common reality. Justice Hunstein was a veteran judge of twentytwo years, 64 with fourteen years on the Georgia Supreme Court when she
was targeted for removal by, among others, the American Justice Partnership. 65 She won the venomous contested race, 66 her first ever, in

61.
Id. at 82-83.
62.
Id. at 133.
63.
Id. at 109.
Judge Hunstein served as judge of the Dekalb County Superior Court from 1984 until she
64.
was appointed by Georgia Governor Zell Miller to the Georgia Supreme Court in 1992. She was
challenged in 2006 by Michael Wiggins, an attorney for the Department of Homeland Security who
"moved from Washington to Atlanta in May, just a month before qualifying." Bret Bell, Hunstein:
Can They Buy a Judgeship?, SAVANNAH Now, Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.savannahnow.comi/node/164280/print.
American Justice Partnership is a collaboration of organizations that join to accomplish
65.
state legal reform. See http://www.americanjusticepartnership.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2008):
In Georgia, millions were spent on TV ads in one of the most negative judicial campaigns
in American history. The Safety and Prosperity Coalition, an interest group that received
the majority of its funding from the American Justice Partnership, an arm of the National
Association of Manufacturers, reported raising over $1.8 million in an effort to defeat
Justice Carol Hunstein.
Voter Rejection of Political Tampering Doesn't Quell Special Interests in '06 Judicial Elections,
MONEY AND POLITICS, Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://www.joycefdn.org/Programs
/MoneyPolitics/NewsDetails.aspx?Newsld=l 25.
66.
Both candidates aired ads leveling personal attacks. An advertisement aired by the Safety
and Prosperity Coalition said: "Carol Hunstein ... voted to throw out evidence that convicted a
[she] even ignored extensive case law and overruled a jury to free a savage
cocaine trafficker ....
rapist." Hunstein's campaign ad attacking her opponent claimed that "Mike Wiggins was sued by
his own mother for taking her money. He sued his only sister. She said he threatened to kill her
while she was eight months pregnant." MONEY AND POLITICS, supra note 65. The ad won a "Pollie," the Oscar for political ads. Jim GALLOWAY, About those other Oscars: Hunstein ad gets a
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which she was challenged by a man whom she described as the opposition's thirty-fifth choice to run against her.67
Justice Louis B. Butler, Jr. was the first and only African-American
justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 68 Justice Butler had twelve
years of judicial experience, sitting as a city judge, circuit judge, and
supreme court justice,69 when he was targeted by special interests and
"phony issue ad groups ''70 as an activist, liberal judge who used loopholes to favor criminal defendants. 7 1 While those who financed the re-

moval of Justice Butler were likely motivated by concerns over tort
cases, 72 they used false accusations about rulings in criminal cases to
ignite and provoke the voters.73 One such television advertisement was
described by the independent, bipartisan Wisconsin Judicial Campaign
Integrity Committee 74 as "offensive" and "race-baiting" 75-reminiscent
of the Willie Horton ads used in the 1988 presidential campaign.76

Pollie, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Feb. 27, 2007, available at http://www.ajc.com
/metro/content/shared-blogs/ajc/poiticalinsiderentries/2007/02/27/about-those other-oscars-hunst.html.
67. Bell, supra note 64.
68. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has seven justices, all of whom are elected to ten-year
terms
in
state-wide
nonpartisan
elections.
See
Wisconsin
Court
System,
http://www.wicourts.gov/about/judges/supreme/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
69. Justice Butler's
biography, http://www.wicourts.gov/about/judges/supreme/retired
/butler.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
70. The phony ad groups were uncovered by Fact Check.org and the Wisconsin Democracy
Campaign.
See Judgment Day in Wisconsin, FACT CHECK, Mar. 7, 2008,
http://www.factcheck.org/judicial-campaigns/judgment-day-in-wisconsin.html;
Viveca Novak,
Wisconsin
Judgment
Day,
the
Sequel,
FAST
CHECK,
Mar.
21,
2008,
http://www.factcheck.org/elections-2008/wisconsin-judgment-day-the-sequel.html);
Hijacking
Justice 2008 Issue Ads in the 2008 Supreme Court Campaign, Feb. 22, 2008,
http://www.wisdc.org/hijackjustice08issueads.php; Nasty Supreme Court Race Cost Record $6
Million, July 22, 2008, http://www.wisdc.org/pr072208.php.
71.
Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
2008; Dee Hall, Supreme Court Debate is Bitter, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/05/25/us/25exception.html.
The New York Times described the race as between a "small-town trial judge with thin
credentials" and "a graduate of the University of Wisconsin law school who served for 12 years as a
judge in Milwaukee courts." Id. at 72. The Wall Street Journal described the election as a "bar
brawl" and Justice Butler as "one of the court's most liberal members." Wisconsin Bar Brawl, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 24, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 120631561392258183.html?mod=opinionmainreview_andoutlooks [hereinafter Brawl].
72. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, after Justice Butler's joinder, was described as having
"dismantled the state's tort reform law, eliminating caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice rulings," and accepting "collective liability for manufacturers in cases involving lead paint."
Brawl, supra note 71.
73.
Novak, supra note 70.
74. For a general discussion of judicial campaign oversight committees, see William Fortune
& Penny J. White, Judicial Campaign Oversight Committees' Complaint Handling in 2006 Elections: Survey and Recommendations, 91 JUDICATURE 232 (Mar./Apr. 2008). The Wisconsin Judicial Campaign Integrity Committee is a bipartisan seven-member task force created by the Wisconsin State Bar following the 2007 Supreme Court elections for the purpose of monitoring Supreme
Court races. The committee educated voters, sought pledges from candidates, monitored campaign
advertising and activities, and reviewed materials to ascertain compliance with the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
See
Judicial
Campaigns
and
Selections,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selectioin/campaigns-and-elections/campaign-oversight.cf
m?state= (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
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2. Targeting Judges Who are Easy to Label
Groups are strategic in choosing which judges to target, often
choosing judges who are easy to label, not based on their true judicial
philosophies, but based on commonly held stereotypes about race and
gender. Labeling a judge as an "activist, '' 77 a "liberal" or as "soft on
crime" is a favorite ploy utilized by those who wish to remove an incumbent. The branding manipulates the public to act out of fear or safety
concerns in a way that wealthy corporations, whining about insurance
rates or jury verdicts, do not. 78 For example, the campaign against Justice Butler in Wisconsin emphasized that he was a minority. Advertisements juxtaposed his picture against pictures of minority defendants.79
Detractors 80 nicknamed him "Loophole Louis" 81 and criticized him for
"putting criminals back on the street" 82 and jeopardizing cases based on
"technicalities," notwithstanding his moderate voting record.
Similarly, the forces that opposed Justice Carol Hunstein in Georgia
chose to target a female justice rather than any one of the three male incumbents who were also on the ballot, 83 even though her record "was
more conservative than her other colleagues. 84 Aware that some might
question the motivation for running against the sole woman on the ballot,
75. Novak, supra note 70; Brennan Center for Justice, Buying Time - 2008: Wisconsin Analysis, May, 12, 2008, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/buying-time_2008 wisconsin;
76. The
Willie
Horton
ad,
used
in
the
Bush-Dukakis
campaign.
http://www.youtube.comwatch?v=EC9j6Wfdq3o (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
77. The recurring use of the label "activist judge" may have been the brainchild of Karl
Rove's early judicial campaigns in Texas and Alabama. Whatever its origins, it has stuck and is the
kiss of death to a judicial candidate.
The term 'activist judges' motivates all sorts of people for very different reasons. If
you're a religious conservative . . . it means judges who established abortion rights or
who interpret Massachusetts's equal-protection clause as applying to gays. If you're a
business conservative, it means those who allow exorbitant jury awards. And in [the
south] especially, the term conjures up those who forced integration.
Joshua Green, Karl Rove in a Corner,THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2004).
78. The United States Chamber of Commerce targets judges by evaluating the rulings that the
judges have made on the high court and "grading them for positive or negative impact on the state's
economy. Then the chamber's Institute for Legal Reform, whose board members include chiefs of
major corporate donors to the judge-ousting campaign, recommend which judges to target." Robert
Lenzer & Matthew Miller, Buying Justice, FORBES 64 (July 21, 2003).
79.
Liptak, supra note 71.
80.
Some reports say that Justice Butler characterized the nickname as "affectionate."
81.
Debra Cassens Weiss, Wisconsin Justice Dubbed 'Loophole Louis' in TV Ads, ABA
JOURNAL
2008,
available
at
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/Wisconsin-justice dubbed loophole louis in tv-ads/; television ad referring to Justice Butler as "Loophole Louis", www.youtube.com/watch?v=mM9CEGPZX2A.
82.
A television advertisement claimed that "Louis Butler worked to put criminals on the
street. Like Reuben Mitchell, who raped an I l-year-old girl with learning disabilities. Butler found
a loophole. Mitchell went on to molest another child." Novak, supra note 70.
83.
See SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2006): How 2006 WAS
THE MOST THREATENING YEAR YET TO THE FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY OF OUR COURTS-AND

How
AMERICANS
ARE
FIGHTING
BACK,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files
/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf.
84.
Nina Totenberg, Report: Spending on Judicial Elections 2006, Oct. 4, 2008,
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=10253213.
In contentious criminal cases, Justice
Hunstein had agreed with the prosecution 39% more often than the court in its entirety. Id.
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a supporter suggested that the campaign needed a better answer than that
the Justice "was a one-legged Jewish female from DeKalb County with 85a
lot of money in the bank and Zell [Miller] as her campaign chair.,
During Justice Hunstein's campaign, United States Attorney General
John Ashcroft 86 recorded an automated telephone call endorsing Hunstein's opponent saying, "[h]e will protect us from terrorists and criminals," and disparaging her as a "liberal incumbent activist judge who will
stop at nothing to win." 87
It is not just the special interests groups who use branding to simplify-and often misstate-the records of judicial candidates. The candidates do so as well, even when they are fully cognizant of the misinformation. Often the candidates compete to drown out one another's law
and order mantra. In 2004, both candidates for the Illinois Supreme
Court were sitting judges, presumably aware of the complexities of judicial decision making. Yet both isolated frightening facts from selected
cases and used them to label their opponent as soft on crime. According
to Maag supporters, Judge Karmeier was "lenient" because he "gave
probation to kidnappers who tortured and nearly beat a ninety-two-yearold grandmother to death." Karmeier supporters countered that Judge
Maag overturned
the conviction of a "man who sexually assaulted a six88
year-old girl.
3. Targeting Judges With a Judicial Paper Trail
To succeed, it is also important to target a sitting judge who has
produced a body of work, a paper trail of judicial opinions that can be
misrepresented, oversimplified, and criticized. Explanations of nuanced
judicial opinions are no competition for simple "tough on crime" rhetoric
in a "world of 'thirty-second ads and snappy sound bites."' 89 While the
Hortonesque ad used against Justice Butler actually referred to a case he
had handled as a public defender, 90 not as a justice, his critics also used
85.
Bell, supra note 64.
86. In The Appeal, Senator Rudd, affectionately known as "the King," tells Fisk, "I don't get
involved in local races .... However, this race is too important .... I've made some powerful
friends in this business, and they will be happy to support your campaign. Just takes a phone call
from me .... My folks can put together a lot of money. Plus, I know the people in the trenches.
The governor, the legislators, the mayors." THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 131-32.
87.
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83.
88.
DEBORAH GOLDBERG, ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2004): How
SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE ON OUR COURTS HAS REACHED A "TIPPING POINT" - AND HOW TO
KEEP OUR COURTS FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 10 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2005) available at

http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf.
89. THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 262.
90. The apparent source for the claim was the case of State v. Mitchell, a case that Butler
handled when assigned as a public defender. Butler's client, Reuben Mitchell, was not released,
although Butler won his appeal based on the introduction of evidence in violation of the rape-shield
statute. State v. Mitchell, No. 86-0879-CR, 1987 WL 267164 at *2-3 (Wis. Ct. App. April 23,
1987). The state successfully appealed the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, who found that the
error was harmless and reinstated the conviction. State v. Mitchell, 424 N.W.2d 698, 707 (Wis.
1998).
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cases from his judicial "trail" to complete the liberal brand. These ads
were also arguably inaccurate. 9'
Opponents also used a judicial trail to defeat Justice Warren
McGraw, a former Chief Justice and member of West Virginia's highest
court, the Supreme Court of Appeals. Brent Benjamin, whose campaign
was largely funded by a special interest organization's two and half million dollar donation, 92 tagged McGraw as an "activist judge who mollycoddles criminals and endangers the welfare of children. 93 The organization complained that McGraw had joined a per curiam opinion which
required a lower court to grant probation to a convicted sex offender in
order to enable him to participate in a proposed rehabilitation plan.94
4. Masking the Real Bull's Eye: Targeting Judges Who are "Not
Business Friendly"
As demonstrated by the political forces in Wisconsin, West Virginia, Washington, and Illinois (to name but a few), the visible platform
of choice of law and order is generally used to mask the opponent's real
agenda-tort reform. Occasionally, however, opponents will use both
messages as was the case with Mississippi's Justice C.P. (Chuck)
McRae. Justice McRae was targeted and removed from the Mississippi
Supreme Court after eleven years of service by pro-business forces. 95

91.
An ad sponsored by Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce claimed that Justice Butler
focused on "needless technicalities" and "nearly allowed a murderer to go free." Wisconsin Judgment Day, the Sequel, supra note 70. The case so described was State v. Jensen, in which Justice
Butler concurred in part and dissented in part. State v. Jensen 727 N.W.2d 518, 537 (Wis. 2007)
(Butler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The issue on which Justice Butler dissented was
an issue left uncertain by recent United States Supreme Court decisions involving the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Ironically, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case raising the
issue a few months after the Jensen decision and decided the matter in June 2008. See Giles v.
California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
92. The organization, known as "And For the Sake of the Kids," donated $2.5 million dollars
to Justice Benjamin's campaign, which was provided by Don Blankenship, CEO of Massey Energy,
and "one of West Virginia's most powerful businessmen." Len Boselovic, Are Campaign Contributors Buying Justice?, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETrE, Sept. 21, 2008 at Al. Blankenship intermittently
claimed that his generosity was either fueled by the desire to do the right thing, Carol Morello,
PoliticalAds Aired in D.C.Target W.Va. Audience, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2004 at BO1, or by economics. Adam Liptak, Judicial Races in Several States Become Partisan Battlegrounds, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 4, 2004 at § 1.
93. Morello, supra note 92, at BO.
94. Id.; see also State v. Arbaugh, 595 S.E.2d 289, 294 (W. Va. 2004) (per curiam). The
defendant, Tony Arbaugh, described by the per curiam majority as having lived a "long and painful
life" and having "endured a long history of sexual assault at the hands of two of his adult male
family members," had been placed on probation. Id. at 290-91. After a circuit court found that he
had violated the probation by the use of drugs and alcohol, Arbaugh was sentenced to prison. The
Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the lower court to allow Arbaugh to participate in
an award-winning private rehabilitation program, Youth Services Systems, organized in conjunction
with the Catholic Church. Id. at 291- 93. "Considering Mr. Arbaugh's tender age and extreme
victimization, we cannot, we will not, surrender any opportunity to salvage his life and to turn him
into a productive member of society." Id. at 294.
95.
Justice Jess Dickinson, who defeated Justice McRae, received $1.2 million from doctors
and small business owners and another $1 million from Mississippians for Economic Progress, a
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Justice McRae was a former president of the Mississippi Trial Lawyers
Association, who prided himself as being the court's defender of the
"have-nots against the haves." 96 Although the forces against him were
primarily business groups interested in electing judges with a sympathetic ear to insurance, health care, and big business, they also utilized
ads that preyed upon the public's fear of crime. 97 Pro-business interests
likewise used dual messages in Wisconsin where Justice Butler and four
of his supreme court colleagues
were credited with making Wisconsin a
"mecca for the trial bar 98 and in West Virginia where Justice McGraw
was seen as hurting the state's business climate: "[w]ithout a change in
the Supreme Court, businesses w[ould] continue to avoid West Virginia. '

99

Similar tactics were used against Chief Justice Gerry Alexander in
Washington. In a six-day period, a single group spent $357,000 on an
advertisement featuring a mother whose young son was killed by a murderer released from prison as a result of a court ruling. 1°° The group
funding the advertisement was "Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse,"
based in Alexandria, Virginia, and organized to limit liability lawsuits.
During the campaign, the group's spokesperson confirmed that it targeted the Chief Justice hoping to achieve tort reform but ran the advertisement for its likely effect despite its complete irrelevance to the
group's agenda. 10 1
Efforts to hide the agenda by manipulating or mixing the message
have not always been the chosen course in judicial campaigns. When
Karl Rove staged the first all-out judicial battle in Texas,' 0 2 he created a
local group funded by the United States Chamber of Commerce. Justice McRae received $700,000,
mostly from trial lawyers. Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 64.
96.
Id.
97.
In the closing weeks of the campaign against Justice McRae, the Law Enforcement Alliance of American, an associate of the National Rifle Association, ran ads suggesting that Justice
McRae was lenient on child predators, having voted to reverse the conviction of a defendant convicted of molesting a three-year old. Justice McRae responded with equally acerbic ads, claiming
that his opponent had been sued for striking a customer with a liquor bottle and for not paying his
bills and that he wished to retain the Confederate flag. Id.
98.
Wisconsin Bar Brawl, supra note 71.
99.
Liptak, supra note 92, at § I (quote attributed to Don Blankenship, primary donor to the
organization that bankrolled Justice Benjamin's successful campaign against Justice McGraw).
100.
Richard Roesier, Supreme Cash Flows, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, Sept. 13, 2006 availableat
www.spokesmanreview.contools/story-breakingnews-pf.asp?ID=-7365.
101.
Id.
102.
Although the battle was ostensibly for the seats on the court, Rove's real interest was in
eliminating the power of Texas Democrats. As Sam Gwynne, Executive Editor of Texas Monthly,
would explain years later:
So it became this giant pitched battle, because it wasn't necessarily about the kind of verdicts and the ease with which someone might get a verdict for the plaintiff, but it was also
about the back end, which was the financing of the entire Democratic Party ....
It's a
battle for the soul of Texas politics because it's a battle for the money,the lifeline money
of Democrats, which is now drying up ....
Interview with Sam Gwynne, Executive Editor, Texas Monthly (Jan. 8, 2005), available at
http:llwww.pbs.orglwgbhlpages/frontlinelshows/architectlinterviews/gwynne.html
[hereinafter
Interview with Gwynne].
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"formula . . . for winning judicial races [that] involved demonizing Democrats as pawns of the plaintiffs' bar and stoking populist resentment
with tales of outrageous verdicts."'10 3 As one Texas lobbyist observed,
reflecting on Rove's winning formula years later: "[h]e knew intuitively,
...that you had to have, as Mark Twain says, 'a devil for the crusade.'..
. [Y]ou had to demonize somebody."' 1 4 In Texas, the demons were
members of the Texas Supreme Court whose stoking was done by the
plaintiff s bar.
Because the Texas Supreme Court does not hear criminal cases, the
platform challenging incumbent justices could not have as its centerpiece
the emotional issues of law and order. But the state was perceived as one
of the most plaintiff-friendly venues in the country, 0 5 with the court
largely controlled by trial lawyers.1 °6 Business leaders believed that this
reputation thwarted economic growth in the state. 10 7 The Texas Medical
Association also resented the court for its record in medical liability
cases, contending that it caused escalating malpractice rates. 0 8 Under
Rove's leadership, the business and medical communities and the state
Republican
Party refined and redefined a "neglected issue-tort re10 9
form."'

Judicial races were traditionally "low salience events, with low public interest, very low free media coverage, and, as a result, low voter
turnout."1 0 In addition, because judicial races are "down ballot" and
often of little interest to the public, significant voter falloff occurs."'
103.
Green, supra note 77.
104.
Interview with Kim Ross, Lobbyist, Texas Medical Association, in Tort Reform in Texas:
Rove's Genius at Work, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architecttexas/tort.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Ross]. Ross continued that "in this case it was
central casting. [The Supreme Court justices] were doing it to themselves .... And it just so happened, because that was that era when the trial lawyers were a very convenient device for us to use
to begin to educate voters in terms of a philosophical shift." Id.
105.
See Interview with Tom Phillips, Chief Justice (1988-2004), Texas Supreme Court, in
Tort
Reform
in
Texas:
Rove's
Genius
at
Work,
http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architect/texas/tort.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Phillips]. According to former Texas Chief Justice Tom Phillips, "Texas's
very lax venue laws ... allowed a disproportionate number of cases to be tried in areas of the state
that had no real connection with the dispute, but were areas where juries were known to be liable to
give a very large award if their sympathies could be properly invoked." Id.
106.
See Interview with Gwynne, supra note 102; see also Interview with Phillips, supra note
106 (stating that the "widespread feeling in Texas ...[was] that the trial lawyers were too powerful
within the legislature").
107.
See Interview with Gwynne, supra note 102.
108.
See John Jack, Corporatefinanced campaigns... Government by the rich, for the rich?,
(April 2000), available at www.afn.org/-iguana/archives/2000_04/20000402.html.
109.
See Interview with Phillips, supra note 105.
110.
George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A Conservative Victory or a
Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1580 (Apr. 2008) (quoting Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
181, 196 (2004).
Ill.
See Mathew Manweller, Examining Decreasing Rates of Voter Falloff in California and
Oregon, 36 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REvIEw 59 (Fall 2004), available at
http://www.cviog.uga.edu/slgr/2004/ld.pdf (explaining that voter falloff is the "difference between
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When Rove and company undertook the first comprehensive defeat of
incumbent supreme court justices in Texas, voter fall-off in some judicial
races ran as high as thirty percent. 1 2 Their task was to interest more of
the public in the judicial selection process. They did so by branding the
trial lawyers as dishonest co-conspirators, flagrantly "buying" justice in
the State of Texas.' 1 3 Framing the issue in this way connected the public
with the coalition, a connection that would have been unlikely had the
emphasis been on the financial complaints of wealthy doctors and business professionals.' 1 4 The merger worked. The campaign--Clean Slate
'88' 5-resulted in the election of five justices, viewed as more friendly
to the coalition's interests.
From those early state-court races until today, the American Tort
Reform Association (ATRA) has been a prime player in the state court
reshaping project. The organization lists its goal as "bringing greater
fairness, predictability, and efficiency to the civil justice system."1 16 It
monitors venues that it calls "judicial hell holes," based primarily on
court decisions in cases involving asbestos exposure, medical malpractice, and automobile liability, and then issues annual reports."t7 Based
upon its findings, it decides which judges to target for removal. As one
business leader explained, "We don't pick our opponents lightly when
we make selections of people to target for replacement on the bench.
how many people go to the polls and how many people actually vote on a specific candidate or
issue."). In other words, a number of voters go to the polls, but do not vote all the way down the
ballot, meaning that they do not vote on judges' races. Hon. Charles K. Wiggins, The Washington
State Supreme Court Elections of 2006: Factors at Work and Lessons Learned, 46 JUDGES'
JOURNAL

5

(Winter

2007),

available

at

hUp://www.abanet.org/jd/publications/jjoumal/2007winter/winterO7.pdf.
112.
See Larry Aspin, Trends in JudicialRetention Elections, 1964-1998, 83 JUDICATURE 79
(Sept./Oct. 1999). These figures apply to retention races, but uncontested elections would have
similar falloff.
113.
See Interview with Bill Miller, Texas political consultant, in Tort Reform in Texas:
Rove's Genius at Work, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architectltexas/tort.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (identifying the "breakthrough moment" as the airing of 60 Minutes'
"Justice for Sale" in 1987, which revealed that Texas Supreme Court justices took hundreds of
thousands of dollars in campaign donations from lawyers appearing before them).
Ironically, a decade later, in a follow-up program entitled "Payola Justice," 60 Minutes
concluded that justices continued to take large amounts of money from those with cases before the
court, but that the source of the donations had shifted to corporations and defense law firms, rather
than plaintiff attorneys, prompting the Austin American-Statesman to editorialize that "Ujustice is
still for sale, but with new buyers." Editorial, Justice is still for sale, but with new buyers, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Nov. 3, 1998), available at www.tpj.org/payola/editoriall .html.
114. See Interview with Ross, supra note 104.
115. See Jack, supra note 108. The political action committee for the Texas Medical Association, TEXPAC, used a video campaign to inform the public. TEXPAC distributed videos detailing
stories of huge verdicts against doctors, prompting members of the medical profession to contribute
to the campaign.
116. The website of the organization, which lists its mission, may be viewed at
http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
117. The "Judicial Hell Holes" reports may be viewed at www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/.
Some lament that jurisdictions that were previously labeled tort "hell holes" are now consumer hell
holes. See Exxon decision may re-emerge in court contest, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (June 29, 2008)
(quoting Alabama
state Democratic
party chair
Joe Tumham),
available at
http://www.al.com/news/huntsvilletimins/idex.ssfPlbase/news/l1214731002124261 .xml&coll=l.
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The primary way to make a selection is tracking all decisions the [court
has made] and determin[ing] how each of the judges ha[s] voted on the
merits of those cases. ' 18 Thus, not only does targeting exist, but its proponents regard it as rather scientific.
B. CampaignsFunded by Millions of Dollars Providedby Unknown and
CamouflagedSpecial Interest Groups: Reality or Pure Fiction?

1. Whose Money?
' 119

Trudeau to Rinehart: "Who are your clients?"

Rinehart: "I can't give you the names, but they're all on your side of
the street. Big companies in energy, insurance, pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, timber, all types of manufacturers,plus doctors, hospitals,
nursing homes, banks. We raise tons of money
and hire the people
20
on the ground to run aggressive campaigns.",,

If the real message is sometimes masked in judicial elections, the
real messenger is often completely hidden. Notwithstanding AMTRA's
leadership role in "reshaping" state courts, it is rarely out front in those
efforts. More usually, AMTRA and several other recognizable organizations filter their support through other groups, groups with warm, benevolent, and sometimes, intelligent-sounding or patriotic names 121 like
West Virginia's "For the Sake of the Kids"; Wisconsin's "Citizens to
Defend the Constitution" and the "Coalition for America's Families";
Georgia's Safety and Prosperity Coalition; Ohio's "Partnership for
Ohio's Future"; and Washington's "It's Time for a Change."
The four most expensive supreme court races in history-three in
Alabama and one in Illinois-and the recent $8 million race in Wisconsin, as well as many others, are notable not only for the amount spent but
also for the source of their funds and the manner in which the funds were
spent. While lawyers historically were the major contributors in judicial
races, donating about ten percent more than business as late as 2000, by
2006 business interests donated twice as much as lawyers. 122 In addition,
special interest groups spent millions more on information or issue advertising. These expenditures, which are not funneled through a candidate's campaign, are not reflected on the campaign disclosure state-

118.
See Jack, supra note 108 (quoting Ginger Sawyer, Louisiana Association of Business and
Industry).
119.

THE APPEAL, supranote 5, at 83.

120.
121.
122.

Id.
The front organization in THE APPEAL was "Lawsuit Victims for Truth." Id. at 222.
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 18.
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3
ment.
1
In 2005-06,
for example,
eighty-four
tures in
judicial
races came
from special
interestspercent
groups.of124total expendi-

These interest groups, not candidates or political parties, supplied
the funds for the greatest increase in expenditure among judicial candidates-television advertising. Most of the advertising reflects the organizational agenda on the issues of tort reform, crime control, and family
values. 25 In the 2006 judicial campaigns, business groups funded more
than ninety percent of all special interest television advertising.126 In the
state of Washington, business interests paid for all of the television ad27
vertising.1
Louisiana
has justCourt
become
the128"latest state to set a
record
for TV And,
spending
on a Supreme
race."'
While the infusion of money and the dominance of television advertising in judicial elections is disturbing, the stealth tactics of the donors is
alarming. The groups use innocuous names to camouflage their identities and mask their sources. They manipulate disclosure requirements by
securing larger contributions at the end of the election cycle, 129 thereby
avoiding reporting them until after the election. And they often escape
reporting requirements altogether by not using "magic words" like
"elect" or "defeat" in their advertisements. 3 °
In the Georgia contest between Justice Carol Hunstein and candidate Michael Wiggins, outside interest groups spent more than $4 million.' 3' The Safety and Prosperity Coalition in Georgia was the highest
123. See generally RACHEL WEISS, FRINGE TACTICS: SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS TARGET
JUDICIAL RACES 3 (2005), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/200508251.pdf; PUBLIC
CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH, THE NEW STEALTH PACs: TRACKING 501(C) NON-PROFIT GROUPS

ACTIVE IN ELECTIONS 11 (2004), http://www.stealthpacs.org/documents/StealthPACs.pdf.
124. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 18.
125. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: How 2000
WAS A WATERSHED YEAR FOR BIG MONEY, SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE, AND TV ADVERTISING IN
STATE
SUPREME
COURT
CAMPAIGNS
5,
13
(2000),

http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASMoneyReport.pdf In 2000, more than $10 million was spent
on more than 22,000 television airings. Id. at 5.
126. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 7.
127. Id. at 12. During the 2006 Washington Supreme Court race between Chief Justice Gerry
Alexander and challenger John Groen, a record 1,081 advertisements ran, all of which were paid for
by three special interests groups. The challenger's supporters spent four times as much on airtime as
did Chief Justice Alexander, who won the race. Id. at 13.
128. Press Release, Brennan Center For Justice, Buying Time - LA Smashes Records, AL Ad
Wars
Go
Negative
(Oct.
9,
2008),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/buying-time la smashes-records-al-ad-wars-go-n
egativel.
129. Most campaign reporting laws require that a final disclosure form be filed after the election, enabling groups to avoid being identified until after the election. In THE APPEAL, Rinehart
"knew the trial lawyers would scrutinize the contributors in the hope that out-of-state money was
pouring in from big business interests .... He was confident he would raise huge sums of money
from out of state, but these donations would pour in at the chosen moment, late in the campaign
when the state's benign reporting laws protected it from being an issue." THE APPEAL, supra note 5,
at 213.
130. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 125, at 18 (providing "[Miany interest groups have invested huge sums in judicial elections [but] avoided disclosing their finances.").
131. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 22.
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spending special interest group in judicial elections in the country in
2006, contributing $1.3 million to the Wiggins campaign. 13 The Coalition funneled its money through an out-of-state group, headquartered in
Michigan, and arranged for most of the money to arrive just weeks before the November election. 33 Justice Hunstein also raised an enormous
amount of money, becoming the 134
first judicial candidate in Georgia to
surpass $1 million in fund-raising.
In Wisconsin and Washington, groups headquartered in Virginia
weighed in, making major contributions to challengers who sought to
unseat incumbent justices. A Virginia-based business coalition known as
the "Coalition for America's Families" reportedly spent more than $1
million to unseat Wisconsin Justice Louis Butler. 135 Another Virginia
group, "Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse,' ' 36 combined with "Citizens
to Uphold the Constitution"'' 37 and "It's Time for a Change"'' 38 to spend
139
more than $2.5 million in 2006 Washington Supreme Court races.
Two other groups, "Constitutional Law PAC" and "FairPAC," forged
ahead independent
of the candidates in favor of or against targeted can0
didates.14
Perhaps the champion silent partner in the effort to restructure state
courts is the United States Chamber of Commerce. Targeting judges in
Texas, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Mississippi, Alabama, West Virginia,
Georgia, Wisconsin, Washington, and other states, some say that the
132.
Id. at 11.
133.
Id. at 22.
134.
Justice Hunstein is reported to have raised $1.38 million despite Georgia's $5000 individual contribution limitation. Id. at 17.
135.
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, Hijacking Justice 2008: Issue Ads in the 2008 Supreme Court Campaign, Feb. 22, 2008, http://wisdc.org/hijackjustice08issueads.php. The Coalition
for America's Families lists its address as Middleton, Wisconsin, and its goal as "continuing the
fight to lower the tax burden and increase the decision-making power of the American Family."
Coalition for America's Families, http://www.coalition4families.com/AboutUs.aspx (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008). The issues it seeks to address are taxes, right to life, right to bear arms, and school
choice. Coalition for America's Families, http://www.coalition4families.com/Home.aspx (last
visited Nov. 1, 2008) (follow "Issues" hyperlink).
136.
In 2006, the two largest donors to Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse were the American
Tort Reform Association and the American Justice Partnership. Together they gave almost
$890,000. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse: Top Contributors,
2006
Cycle,
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail contribs.php?cycle=2006&ein=203371803
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2008).
137.
According to a Seattle newspaper, Citizens to Uphold the Constitution is supported by
labor, environmental groups, trial lawyers and other organizations. Andrew Garber, State Supreme
Court Contests Spark "Fundraising Arms Race," SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20060914&slug=supremel 4m.
138.
According to the blog from the Spokesman Review, "It's Time for a Change" is a PAC
backed by the Washington Building Industry.
Posting of Rich to Eye on Olympia,
http://www.spokesmanreview.comlblogs/olympialarchive.asp?postD=-4008 (Sept. 13, 2006).
139. SAMPLE ET AL., supranote 83, at 21.
140.
Ralph Thomas, Interest Groups Targeting State Supreme Court Races, SEATTLE TIMES,
May
23,
2006,
at
BI,
available
at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20060523&slug=court23m.
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Chamber operates under the strategy that it's cheaper to buy a state supreme court than an entire state legislature. 14 1 The Chamber and its supporters respond that they are merely righting a system42that had become
obscenely one-sided after years of trial-lawyer control.
In less than three-quarters of a decade, 43 the Chamber of Commerce has infused hundreds of millions of dollars into state court
races. 144 Even assuming that "turn about is fair play," the Chamber's
furtiveness is problematic. The Chamber often masks contributions and
avoids disclosure by characterizing its efforts as "informational" rather
than as candidate support. 145 The Chamber also sabotages unsuspecting
candidates by pumping thousands of out-of-state dollars into cover organizations, who then enlarge the campaign's coffers in the final days of
the campaign, creating a blitzkrieg. 146 When, for example, the Chamber
decided to target Justice Chuck McRae of Mississippi, they channeled a
million dollars through various local groups; 147 in other cases, channeling
also occurred, using ally political action committees. Moreover, it is
commonplace for the Chamber to funnel donations through its taxexempt unit, the Institute for Legal Reform, 148 49thus giving most of the
contributing corporations a hefty tax deduction. 1
2. How Much Money?
150

Fisk: "What makes you think I can beat her?"'

Rinehart's Agent to Fisk: "Because we have the5 money ....
Unlimited. We partner with some powerful people."' '
141.
See Jesse M. Reiter, The Purchasing of our State Supreme Courts: How Goliath is Beating
David
in
Courtrooms
Across
America,
July
19,
2007,
http://www.buzzflash.com/articles/contributors/1 172.
142. Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 67.
143.
The genesis of the "war on the judges" is said to have been a meeting between Chamber
President Thomas Donohue and Home Depot founder Bernard Marcus in 2000. Id. at 70.
144.
Id. at 65. The article refers to the Chamber's involvement as a "secret war" with its
"prime objective: to vote out judges supported by trial lawyers, labor unions and the Democratic
Party and install new judges sympathetic to insurance companies, multinational corporations and the
Republican Party." Id. at 64-65.
145.
Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 67.
146.
1 borrow this term directly from Grisham, but he is not the only one to use it to describe
judicial campaigns. See THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 109; see also Paul D. Carrington, Judicial
Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
79, 82 (Summer 1998).
147.
Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 64.
148.
The Institute for Legal Reform is forthright about its mission, stating, "The U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) is a national campaign, representing the nation's business community, with the critical mission of making America's legal system simpler, fairer and faster for everyone." About ILR, www.instituteforlegalreform.comlabout/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
The Institute further states that, "Founded by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 1998 to address the
country's litigation explosion, ILR is the only national legal reform advocate to approach reform
comprehensively by not only working to change the legal culture, but also to change the legislators
and judges that create that culture." Id.
149.
Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 70.
150.
THE APPEAL, supranote 5, at 108.
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15 2
Fisk: "How much will this cost?"

Rinehart's Agent to Fisk: "Three million bucks."'

153

154

Fisk: "And you can raisethat much money?"'

Rinehart's Agent to Fisk: "[We] already
[have] the commitments.
' 55
more.
get
we'll
more,
need
we
if
And

Raising and spending money to get elected to the bench is nothing
new. But a study of the three election cycles before 2000 showed that
around one-third of the candidates for judicial office raised no funds at
all. 156 Even among those who did raise money, the amounts raised and
expended were relatively low in comparison to today's standards. What
was of interest to observers about the year 2000-a year pegged as the
"watershed year for big money, special interest pressure, and TV advertising in state supreme court campaigns"157-was the dramatic increase
in the amount of money spent in supreme court races. The more than
$45 million raised and expended by supreme court candidates represented a sixty-one percent increase over the amount raised in 1998 and a
one hundred percent increase over amounts raised in 1994.158 All combined, candidates for supreme court seats have raised over $157 million
since 1999, with $46.8 million raised
in the 2004-05 cycle and $34.4
159
million raised in the 2005-06 cycle.
If 2000 was a watershed year for the expenditure of money in state
supreme court elections, it was nonetheless the tip of the iceberg in comparison to the sums spent since then. Aggregate candidate fundraising
records were broken in forty percent of the states with supreme court
races in 2004.160 It was also the year of the single most expensive judicial race in United States history, the $9.3 million contest in Illinois between Illinois Court of Appeals Judge Gordon Maag and Circuit Judge
Lloyd Karmeier. 16 1 This figure almost doubled the previous record for a
state judicial election. 162 Moreover, the election was not even state-wide,

151.
Id. at 109.
152. Id. at 111.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 125, at 8 fig. 2.
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id. at4.
159. SAMPLE E7 AL., supra note 83, at 15 & n.10. The lesser amount in 2005-06 reflects the
number of contested elections in that year, 27 as compared to 33 contested elections in 2004-05. Id.
160. GOLDBERG ET AL, supra note 88, at 13.
161.
Torts and Courts, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2008, at 36.
162. Brennan Center for Justice, Avery v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/avery_v state-farmautomobile-ins-co/.
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involving instead thirty-seven southern Illinois counties. 163 Special interest spending for the race pitted pro-business and Republican organizations against trial lawyers, labor groups, and Democratic organizations.' 64 In the end, Justice Karmeier
raised slightly more than Judge
1 66
Maag, 165 and won the election.

The campaign to become Alabama's Chief Justice in 2006 was the
second most expensive judicial race in U.S. history, with a total of $8.2
million raised between the primary and general campaigns.1 67 As in illinois, the judicial election battle was a war between business interests and
the chamber of commerce and trial lawyers, characterized as "not exactly
evenly matched opponents,"'' 68 with the business community being positioned to outspend the trial lawyers two to one. 169 In addition to attracting big business dollars, Alabama also attracts pure partisan dollars as
one of the few states with partisan appellate elections. 170 This may help
to explain Alabama's status as the1 71
home of three of the four most expensive judicial campaigns in history.
The spending levels set by candidates in Illinois and Alabama were
not surpassed, but they are within the sights of judicial candidates in
many other states, including Wisconsin, West Virginia, Georgia, Wash163.
Geri L. Dreiling, Supreme Fight, ILL. TIMES, May
http:llwww.illinoistimes.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A3205.

27, 2004,

available at

164.
JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS:
RECUSAL STANDARDS 21 fig. 5 (2008).

SETTING

165. The total reported contributions to Justice Karmeier's "Citizens for Karmeier" campaign
were $4,802,869, while the total reported contributions to Judge Maag's "Maag for Justice" campaign were $4,580,588. The Maag contributions are detailed at Illinois Campaign for Political
Reform,
Maag,
Gordon
(2003-2004
Cycle),
http://www.ilcampaign.orgsunshine/icpr/icpr-filer.aspx?cycle=2003-2004&id=8508
(last visited
Nov. 1, 2008). The Karmeier contributions are detailed at Illinois Campaign for Political Reform,
Karmeier,
Lloyd
(2003-2004
Cycle),
http://www.ilcampaign.org/sunshine/icpr/icprfiler.aspx?cycle=2003-2004&id=8502
(last visited
Nov. 1, 2008).
166.
When Fisk asks "[wihat makes you think I can [win]?" the real response is "[b]ecause we
have the money." THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 108-09. While testing that assertion is beyond the
scope of this Essay, a few observations should be made. "[Tihe correlation between strong fundraising and electoral success persists. In 2003-2004, 35 out of 43 high court races were won by the top
fundraisers, a success rate of 81 percent. This figure represents an increase from 80 percent in 20012002, and 71 percent in 1999-2000." GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 16 & n.20. The percentage declined in 2006, with 17 of 25 top fund raisers winning the election. Some predict that this
may indicate a "voter backlash against big-money, heavy-handed court campaigns," though acknowledging that it is too soon to tell if it is a trend or a "blip." SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 24
&n.17.
167. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 5.
168. Scott Horton, The Best Justice Money Can Buy, HARPER'S, Dec. 13, 2007, available at
http://harpers.org/archive/2007/12/hbc-90001908.
169. SAMPLE ET AL., supranote 83, at 18 fig. 11.
170.
IN

1d. at 6; see also THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY REPORT ON JUDICIAL SELECTION
STATES:
APPELLATE
AND
GENERAL
JURISDICTION
COURTS
(2007),

www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Judicial%20Selection%2OCharts.pdf (reporting that eight states have
partisan elections for judges on the state's highest court: Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia).
171.
SAMPLE ET AL.,supra note 83, at 15.
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ington, Louisiana, and Ohio. In the 2008 campaign fueled by tort reform
interests, two candidates for the Wisconsin Supreme Court jointly raised
about $1 million, but spent $5 million,1 72 most of which was provided by
"outside special interest groups that secretly raised and spent most of that
money on negative ads about the candidates. '' 3 In West Virginia in
2004, the challenger, and now Justice, Brent Benjamin raised and spent
far in excess of Justice Warren McGraw. Justice Benjamin received $2.4
million from one donor and $745 thousand from another. 17 4 Georgia
Supreme Court Justice Carol Hunstein began with a $125 thousand war
chest, but managed to extend that amount to $1.38 million to defeat challenger Michael Wiggins, who received $1.75 million from one donor, the
Safety and Prosperity Coalition. 175 The Washington numbers were
lower: approximately $1 million in a 2004 supreme court race 176 and
more than $4 million in 2006.177
As 2008 draws to a close, Louisiana is on target to have its most expensive supreme court election in a decade. 178 Candidates and special
interest groups combined to spend more than $5.9 million through the
third quarter of the year; 179 a significant upsurge in spending was occurring as the campaign headed into the final weeks. 180 Twenty-eight seats
on fourteen supreme courts remain open, with elections in November
2008. Through November, candidates in those races had raised nearly
$30 million dollars. 81
All contested judicial elections require incumbent judges to spend
time raising money and campaigning during election years. In some
172. Liptak, supra note 71, at Al.
173. Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, Nasty Supreme Court Race Cost Record $6 Million:
Candidates Were Outspent $4 to $1 by Outside Special Interests (July 22, 2008),
http://www.wisdc.org/pr072208.php. Among the contributors were Club for Growth Wisconsin;
Coalition for America's Families, a Virginia-based coalition of businesses and non-profit groups; the
Greater Wisconsin Committee, a Milwaukee-based group; and the Wisconsin Manufacturers &
Commerce, the state's largest business organization. Id.
174.
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 4 n.6. Don Blankenship, CEO of Massey Energy,
donated the larger amount through an organization known as "For the Sake of the Kids" which
filtered the money to the Benjamin campaign. The smaller amount was donated by an organization
called "Doctors for Justice." Id.
175.
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 20.
176.
Thomas, supra note 140, at B 1.
177.
Kate Riley, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections, THE SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at B6,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.conhtml/opinion/2003422757_rileyl4.htmil.
178.
Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Louisiana, Alabama, Ohio Lead TV Spending Surge in State
Supreme
Court
Races,
www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/buying-time-la-al-oh-lead-spending-surge/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008).
179.
Brennan Center for Justice, Buying Time: Special Interests and Supreme Court Elections,
www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/buying-time special-interests-conspicuouslyabsent-fro
m-supreme-court elect/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
180. Spending increased from $178,600 to $316,000 from the second to third week in September 2008. Id.
181.
2008 Supreme Court Elections: More Money, More Nastiness, Nov. 5, 2008,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=5,55,1104
(last visited Nov. 11,
2008).
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states, judges must run in both primary and general elections increasing
the amount of time and money that the judge must expend. The need to
campaign and to raise large amounts of money interferes with the judge's
ability to perform the duties of office and affects a judge's and, consequently, a court's, productivity during election season. But campaign
demands may also result in a war-chest phenomenon. In order to ward
off potential contenders, judges may feel the need to raise funds continuously, thereby decreasing their productivity well beyond election year.
For example, in 2006, two incumbent justices in Michigan raised a com1 82
bined $1 million despite what was described as "token opposition.
An Illinois Supreme Court justice raised more than $1.7 million before
she realized she would not have opposition. 83
C. Campaigns Fundedfor the Purpose of "Restructuringthe Court" and
Justices Fulfilling Commitments Once Elected: Reality or Pure Fiction?
Fisk to Rinehart's' Agent: "I want to know why these people are
willing to pony 184
up three million bucks to support someone they've
never heard of."
Rinehart's Agent: "These are people who are demanding change,
and they are willing to pay for it." 185
' 186
"We will expect a commitment to limit liability in civil litigation."

"Justice Fisk wrestled with the case.... [H]e had great sympathy for
the child, but would not allow his emotions to become a factor. On
the other hand, he had been elected on a platform of limiting liability.
...
When a case involved a substantial verdict, the insurance com' 187
panies could now relax."
When a well-financed judge is elected on a well-defined platform,
what do the financial backers expect? The answer to that loaded question depends on who is asked and under what circumstances. When the
public is asked, nine out of ten respond that special interest groups are
mobilizing courts to promote their own agendas, and eight out of ten
judges agree.1 88 But special interest groups who spend thousands each
election cycle vow to be interested only in assuring a balanced and fair

182. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 20.
183. Michael Higgins, Burke to Return Most of War Chest to Donors Unopposed in Primary,
Justice Will Empty Coffers, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan.
21, 2008,
at
1, available at
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/jan/21/news/chi-burke_2ljan2l.
184.
THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 152.
185.

Id.

186. Id. at 112.
187. Id.at 313.
188. Alexander Wohl, The Judge on the Stump, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 12, 2002, available at
http:llwww.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=judge-on the stump.
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state court system. For example, the Institute for Legal Reform, the political arm of the United States Chamber of Commerce, lists its mission
as "making America's legal system simpler, fairer and faster for everyone."'189 To this end, it routinely invests millions of dollars to replace
judges who are not (and who have not been objectively identified as)
obscure, unfair, or inefficient.
Like a teacher when students meet expectations, the groups cannot
conceal their exhilaration with (and approval of) the results. They loudly
applaud every decision that advances the group's agenda, even when
their pupils behave in ways that are inimical to model judicial behavior.19° The American Tort Reform Association, for example, boasts on
its webpage, "besides naming two new Judicial Hellholes this year, the
biggest headline may be the fact that Madison County, Illinois is no
longer a Hellhole [since] courts there have undertaken several positive
reforms which justify moving the county this year to the report's 'Watch
List."''" A fair translation of ATRA's message is this: we received a
high return on our investment; the judges we installed did just what we
expected them to do, notwithstanding the questionable conduct of their
initiates. 192 Thus, the short answer about the special interests' expectations is that they expect results. And if anecdotal evidence has any
value, they appear to realize their expectations.
When a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice whose campaign had
been bankrolled by Wisconsin's largest business organization authored
the opinion in a case which the organization financed, the financiers
praised the decision. 193 Though they characterized it as a "major victory

189.
Institute for Legal Reform, www.instituteforlegalreform.org/about/index.cfm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008).
190. The Wisconsin State Judicial Commission filed an ethics complaint against Justice Michael Gableman who defeated Justice Louis Butler in the spring. The complaint alleges that Gableman knowingly leveled false charges against Butler in an advertisement that claimed that Butler had
"worked to put criminals on the street." Patrick Marley & Steven Walters, Judicial Commission
Says Gableman Ad was Deceiving, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 2008,

available at

http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/32440994.html. The ad concerned a case that Butler
handled as a public defender, not a judge. Butler initially won on appeal, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that any error in the case was harmless. The defendant served his entire sentence. FactCheck.org, Wisconsin Judgment Day, the Sequel, http://www.factcheck.org/elections2008/wisconsin-judgment day-thesequel.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
191.
American Tort Reform Foundation, Report Names New Judicial Hellholes,
http://www.atra.org/newsroomlreleases.php?id=8202 (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). The report adds
"The #1 Judicial Hellhole from 2002 to 2004 dropped to the #4 position in 2005, and then into
'purgatory' at #6 last year. Continued progress in restoring judicial fairness led by Chief Judge Ann
Callis and Judge Daniel Stack, combined with substantial drops in the filing of class action, asbestos
and large claims, has led ATRF to move Madison County onto the Watch List." AMERICAN TORT
REFORM

FOUNDATION,

JUDICIAL

HELLHOLES

(2007),

http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf.
192. See "Citizens for Karmeier" supra note 165.
193. Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, WMC Hails Supreme Court Ruling in Menasha
Corp. Tax Case (July 11, 2008), http://www.wmc.org/display.cfm?ID=1854.

2008]

"THE APPEAL" TO THE MASSES

for all taxpayers," the 94taxpayer beneficiaries of the $350 million were
Wisconsin businesses. 1
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, the state's largest business
lobby, spent more than $2 million to help Justice Anne Ziegler win an
open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. After winning, Justice
Ziegler was poised to hear a case which could result in $350 million in
tax refunds to Wisconsin businesses, a case that Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce had helped to finance. 95 Despite public outcry about
the case, Justice Ziegler not only refused to recuse herself, but also authored the majority
opinion in the 4-3 case which found in favor of the
196
businesses.
The refusal to recuse was but one in a long line of cases indicative
of Justice Ziegler's troubling interpretation of the role of a judge. As a
circuit judge, Ziegler ruled in two dozen cases involving a bank on which
her husband was a paid member of the board of directors.197 The state's
ethics rule clearly prohibited judges from hearing cases involving businesses if the judge's spouse was a director of that business. 98 But Justice Ziegler sat on twenty-four such cases and ruled for the bank twentyone times. 199
While no one but Justice Ziegler could say with certainty whether
her rulings were influenced by campaign contributions or family relations, her refusal to step aside in these cases, while quite satisfying to her
contributors, gives the public a jaundiced view of the bench, which further confuses the already muddled understanding of the role of the
courts. While the agenda-laden Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce
"hailed" the decision, Wisconsin newspapers called for Justice Ziegler's
resignation. 200 The calls for the Justice's resignation poignantly disclose

194.
Id. The case concerned the purchase of $5 million custom software, an unlikely purchase
for the average taxpayer. Wis. Dep't Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 745 N.W.2d 95, 103 (Wis. 2008).
195.
Patrick Marley, Ziegler Faces Conflict Questions, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Mar.
5, 2007, at B I availableat www.jsonline.comlstory/index.aspx?id=573250.
196.
Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 754 N.W.2d 95, 126 (Wis. 2008). Justice Louis
Butler, who was defeated by another candidate promoted by Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, joined the dissent in the case. Id. at 147 (Butler, J., dissenting). The issue of Butler's recusal
was also raised because an attorney on his campaign finance committee represented Menasha Corporation and contributed to Butler's campaign. Editorial, Step aside in this case, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL
SENTINEL,
Nov.
28,
2007,
at
A12,
available
at
www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=691180.
197. Marley, supra note 195, at BI. Although Justice Ziegler's opponent raised this conflict of
interest during the Supreme Court campaign in 2007, Ziegler won the election. Soon afterwards,
however, the Judicial Commission investigated the complaint, the first-ever investigation of a sitting
justice, and recommended a public reprimand. Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Panel Recommends Ziegler Reprimand, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Sept. 7, 2007, at Al, available at
www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=658384.
198. Marley, supra note 195, at B 1.
199.
Id. See Editorial supra note 196.
200. Editorial, Ziegler Should Quit the Bench, THE CAPITAL TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2007, at A8.
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that the harm from her conduct extends far beyond the individual decision or the judge:
To try to pretend that Ziegler is not doing severe damage to the reputation of the state's highest court, and more broadly to the rule of
law, is at this point untenable to anyone who has sworn a solemn oath
to "support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of the state of Wisconsin"
and to "faithfully and impartially discharge
20 1
the duties of office."
The explosion of special interest money in judicial campaigns has
amplified this disturbing trend of judges hearing cases that involve their
campaign contributors. Wisconsin's Justice Ziegler, unfortunately, is but
one example. It is likely more than coincidence that two other glaring
examples involve sitting justices whose multimillion dollar campaigns
were financed by special interests groups with clear judicial agendas.
The justices in the other two examples both refused to disqualify
themselves in cases involving their most generous donors; their conduct
led litigants to beseech the United States Supreme Court to intervene and
address whether participation in a principal financial supporter's case
violates due process of law.20 2
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Lloyd Karmeier prevailed in the
most expensive, and by some accounts the most bitter,0 3 supreme court
race in history in 2004. Included in his $4.8 million in contributions was
$1.35 million in donations from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, its lawyers, its affiliates, and its affiliates' lawyers. 2° In
1999, plaintiffs had secured a monumental $1.05 billion verdict against
State Farm. 20 5 State Farm appealed, but the judgment was affirmed by a
unanimous Illinois Court of Appeals in 2001. In late 2002, the Illinois
Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' permission to appeal. The court
held oral argument in May 2003, at a time when Justice Karmeier was
not a member of the court. The case remained pending during and after
the election. When it became apparent that newly-elected Justice Karmeier intended to participate in the decision, plaintiffs moved for his
Id.
201.
202.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., No. 08-22
(July 2, 2008), 2008 WL 2676568 [hereinafter Caperton Writ]. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i,
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006) (No. 05-842), 2005 WL 3662258
[hereinafter Avery Writ].
203.
The election was described by the St. Louis Post Dispatch as an "ugly, dispiriting, destructive, misleading, money-drenched race." Editorial, Buying Justice, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Nov.
5, 2004, at B6.
204. Avery Writ, supra note 202, at 6.
205. The case against State Farm was a nation-wide class action involving two claims, one
alleging breach of contract and one alleging consumer fraud. The contract claims were tried by a
jury, while the judge tried the consumer fraud claims in a bifurcated seven-week trial. The jury
awarded in excess of $450 million dollars in contract damages. Once punitive damages and damages for disgorgement and consumer fraud were included the verdict exceeded $1 billion. Id. at 4.
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recusal noting that "perhaps through oversight" the justice
had failed to
20 7
disqualify himself.2 °6 State Farm opposed the motion.
Twenty-seven months after oral argument, in August 2005,2°8 the Ilinois Supreme Court reversed the verdict against State Farm, with Justice Karmeier agreeing and casting the deciding vote on the breach of
contract claim. 20 9 The extraordinary timeline of the case added to its
rankness. The fllinois Supreme Court issued its decision in the State
Farm case months beyond the acceptable, though voluntary,2 10 time period for opinion preparation as established by the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Appellate Courts. 211 Delay in any case adversely affects the litigants; it may also have a detrimental effect on the
public's perception of the courts. But when the delay is inordinatemore than two years from argument to decision-and when it appears to
be purposeful, its potential harm is multiplied. 212
Yet neither the delay nor its potential harm reduced the cheers of
the United States Chamber of Commerce. They celebrated the decision
as a significant victory in favor of the business community and against
class actions.213 Others were not so elated, warning that the judge's poor
judgment had dramatic widespread ramifications:
[T]he juxtaposition of gigantic campaign contributions and favorable
judgments for contributors creates a haze of suspicion over the highest court in Illinois.... Although Mr. Karmeier is an intelligent and
no doubt honest man, the manner of his election will case doubt over
every vote he casts in a business case. This shakes public respect214for
the courts and the law-which is a foundation of our democracy.
Plaintiffs in State Farm unsuccessfully urged the United States Supreme Court to determine whether Justice Karmeier's failure to recuse

206.
Id. at 6.
207. Id. at 9.
208.
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 164, at 22 (discussing case timeline).
209.
Id.
210.
See National Center for State Courts, Case Processing Time Standards,
www.ncsconline.org/cpts/cptsState.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
211.
Standard 3.52 sets forth that 90% of all cases in a state court of last resort should be concluded within a year of oral argument. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, § 3.52,
(ABA Comm'n on Standards of Judicial Admin. 1994); STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
DELAY REDUCTION, §§ 3.52-.55, (ABA Judicial Admin. Div. 1988).
212.
Standard 2.4 of the Appellate Court Performance Standards and Measures requires that
appellate courts resolve cases expeditiously.

APPELLATE COURT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND

MEASURES, Standard 2.4, (Nat'l Ctr. for State Cts. & App. Ct. Performance Standards Comm'n.
1999),
available
at
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/appellate&CISOPTR=56.
213.
Business Wire, Chamber Hails Illinois Supreme Court Decision on State Farm, Aug. 18,
2005, http://findarticles.comlp/articles/mii-mOEIN/is_2005-August_18/ai-n14926963.
214.
Editorial, Illinois Judges: Buying Justice?, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Dec. 20, 2005, at
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himself violated their due process right to a fair and impartial tribunal.21 5
Had the Court weighed in, states might have avoided a similar incident,
which is equally disturbing and has unfolded in West Virginia. Like
Justices Ziegler and Karmeier, Justice Brent Benjamin was involved in a
well-funded, rancorous campaign for the state supreme court. He successfully unseated an incumbent justice with the financial backing of
Don Blankenship, the CEO of Massey Energy and one of West Virginia's business elite. 216 All totaled, Benjamin received $3 million in
contributions from Blankenship and the PACs. This amount constituted
over sixty percent of Benjamin's total campaign finances. 217
Blankenship's company, Massey Energy, was embroiled in lengthy
litigation with Hugh Caperton, the owner of a coal production company
in West Virginia. 18 In 2002, a lower court in West Virginia ordered
Massey Energy to pay $50 million for tortuous interference with Caperton's business as well as for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment.2 19 In 2004, as the case lay dormant, Brent Benjamin was elected to
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
In October 2006, Massey Energy sought review in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Prior to Massey's filing, the plaintiff
requested Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. Justice Benjamin declined. The court granted review and then reversed the $50 million verdict against Massey Energy. 22° Two justices dissented and characterized
the majority decision as a "result-driven" effort.22 1
While the plaintiffs petition for rehearing was pending, photographs surfaced of Don Blankenship together with Chief Justice Elliot
Maynard, a member of the court's majority, at a vacation spot on the
222
French Rivera.
In the subsequent furor, the court agreed to rehear the
appeal. While the Chief Justice denied impropriety, he recused himself

215.
The issue presented in the petition for certiorari was whether a judge may "receive more
than $1 million in direct and indirect campaign contributions from a party and its supporters, while
the party's case is pending, [and] cast the deciding vote in that party's favor consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Avery Writ, supra

note 202, at i.
216.
Blankenship donated $1.7 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign through the organization "For the Sake of the Kids." Len Boselovic, Are Campaign Contributors Buying Justice?,

PITTSBURG POST-GAZETrE, Sept. 21, 2008, at Al.
217.
Liptak, supra note 92, at 11.
Caperton Writ, supra note 202, at 8.
218.
219.
Id. at5.
220.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 2008 W. Va. LEXIS 22, 135 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008).
The reversal was based on a forum selection clause in a contractual agreement to which neither
Massey Energy nor Caperton were parties and despite the fact that the verdict rendered against
Massey was on tort, not contract grounds. Id. at 42.
Id. at 137.
221.
222.
Ian Urbina, West Virginia's Top Judge Loses His Re-election Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,

available
at
2008,
at
A25,
www.nytimes.com2008/05/15/us/15judge.htm?-r=1-&scp=l &sq=west%20virginia's%20top%20jud
ge%201oses%20his%20re-election%20bid&st=cse&oref=slogin.
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from further proceedings in the case as did Justice Larry Starcher, one of
the two dissenting justices, who had been vocal in his opposition to
Blankenship' s financial entanglement with the court.22 3
Justice Starcher was candid about the effect of campaign contributions on the case's outcome. In a blunt opinion, he issued an invitation to
Justice Benjamin to join him in recusing.
I repeat-the pernicious effects of Mr. Blankenship's bestowal of his
personal wealth and friendship have created a cancer in the affairs of
this Court. And I have seen that cancer grow and grow .... At this
point, I believe that my stepping aside in the instant case might be a
step in treating that cancer-but only if others as well rise to the challenge. If they do not then I shudder to think of the cynicism and disgust that lawyers, judges and citizens of this wonderful State will
feel about our judicial system.
And I reiterate that unless another justice also steps aside in this
case, my replacement on the Court will be selected by the justice
whose campaign was supported by something close
to $4,000,000
224
from monies that came from one side of the case.
Justice Benjamin declined Justice Starcher's invitation as well as
the suggestions of state-wide media.225 Because he stood next in line to
serve as Chief Justice under West Virginia's rotational plan, Benjamin
also appointed the two replacement judges to sit in the place of the
recused justices.2 26 In April of 2008, four years after the original hearing, the court reheard the case and once again reversed by a 3-2 margin,
with Justice Benjamin joining the majority.
The United States Supreme Court was again invited to determine
whether due process requires the recusal of a judge who received large
campaign contributions from a party or an attorney:2 27 This time, the
Court has accepted the invitation, granting the Petition for Certiorari on
November 14, 2008.228 The Petition stresses the importance of the issue:
In light of the increasing prominent role of money in judicial elections and the public perception of impropriety that such campaign
223.
224.

Id.
Notice of Voluntary Disqualification of the Hon. Larry V. Starcher, Justice of the Su-

preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. v. Caperton, No. 33350 (Feb.
15, 2008) (reprintedin SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 164, at 19).
225. Editorial, Bravo, CHARLESTON GAzETrE, Feb. 16, 2008, at 4A, available at
http://wvgazette.com/Opinion/Editorials/200802150735.
226. Boselovic, supra note 215, at Al.
227.
Caperton Writ, supra note 202, at 8. The issue presented for review in the Petition is
"whether Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from participating in his principal financial
supporter's case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
228. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008),
cert. granted,77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14,2008) (No. 08-22).
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contributions tend to generate, this Court should clarify the circumstances in which due process requires the recusal of a judge who
benefited from the campaign expenditures of a party or an attor229
ney.

Perhaps, in addressing the issue, the Court will consider the weight
of empirical evidence indicating that judicial voting records track campaign contributions. Studies conducted in Ohio show that Ohio justices
vote with their contributors seventy-five percent of the time,23 ° while
similar studies in Louisiana show a contributor-decision ratio of sixtyfive percent.23' While it may be impossible to scientifically validate
cause and effect, when asked, judges candidly admit that a causal relationship exists. More than a quarter of state court judges believe that
campaign contributions have an influence on judges' decisions.232 Some
surprisingly state the simple truth: "everyone interested in contributing
has very specific interests.,, 233 "It's pretty hard in big-money races not to
take care of your friends.

234

The public overwhelmingly agrees. Although most Americans con-

tinue to express a belief that "[i]n spite of its problems, the American
justice system is still the 'best in the world,' '

235

only thirty percent ex-

pressed a high level of confidence in the overall justice system. 2 36 The
public's lack of confidence is generated by the influence of money in
judicial elections. Since the beginning of this decade, Americans have
229.
Caperton Writ, supra note 202, at 27.
230.
Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
1,
2006,
at
Al,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/Oljudges.html?pagewanted=print.
Justice
Terrence
O'Donnell's concurrence with his contributors was reported as 91% of the time.
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Adam Liptak, Looking Anew at Campaign Case and Elected Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2008,
at
A14,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29bar.html?sq=Liptak&st=nyt&scp=2&adxnnlx=12016190
26-XtMkjm/3pEJv8ra4bwZ6oA&pagewanted=print. Two of the Louisiana justices voted with their
contributors 80% of the time. A recent Texas study claims that six of the current Texas Supreme
Court justices took two-thirds of their campaign contributions from lawyers and litigants who appeared before them. Press Release, Texans for Public Justice, Uncovering Massive Campaign Conflicts, TPJ Calls for Halt to "Payola Justice" (Oct. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.tpj.org/reports/courtroomcontributions/pressrelease.pdf.
Others claim the study is the
product of trial lawyer rhetoric. See Press Release, Texans for Lawsuit Reform, Texans for Public
Funded by Trial Lawyers (Nov. 2, 2006), availableat http://www.tortreform.com/node/369/print.
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While 26% of state court judges say that campaign contributions have some influence on
decisions, 72% believe they have at least "some influence." Memorandum from Greenberg Quinlan
Rosner Research, Inc. & American Viewpoint to Justice at Stake Campaign I (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://gqrr.com/articles/1617/14 10_JAS-report.pdf.
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Liptak & Roberts, supra note 230, at Al (quoting Justice Paul Pfeifer as saying, "I never
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expressed increasing concern about the effect of campaign contributions
on judicial decision-making.23 7 More than three-fourths of voters believe
that campaign contributions have an influence on judges' decisions. 38
To almost seventy percent of that number, that "influence" results in
contributors receiving favorable treatment in the courts.239
CONCLUSION: TESTING SOLUTIONS

Scientific validation of the effect that campaign contributions and
special interest agendas have on judicial decision making is unnecessary
to conclude that state courts systems face real danger. The emerging
setting is a court system seen as providing justice for some but rarely for
all; the plot is an effort to hijack the courts. As the justice system is increasingly perceived as unfair, favoring the wealthy, controlled by special interests, and being influenced by contributions, it will cease to be a
viable method of dispute resolution.
When the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of a candidate for judicial office to announce views on contested legal or political
issues in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,24° the Court maintained there was a difference between announcements, which are constitutionally protected, and promises, pledges, and commitments, which
arguably are not.24 1 But that difference-unlike Grisham's assertions
tested in this essay-is in reality pure fiction, much more the sophistry of
Supreme Court analysis than reflective of human cognition. When a
judicial campaign is focused on issues of limiting liability and tort reform, for example, the public does not separate the information into discrete categories of "announcements" and "commitments." Rather, the
public accepts and processes the information as defining the candidate's
platform and signifying the candidate's future judicial behavior.
In addition to perpetuating a misunderstood role of the courts, there
are other byproducts of the new setting for state judicial elections. Campaigning and fundraising, even on a small scale, take time away from
judicial duties, time when judges could be issuing opinions consistent
with reasonable appellate deadlines. Even judges who are not on the
ballot or who have little or no opposition feel mounting pressure to establish a war chest in order to deter potential challengers. Moreover, even
Memorandum from Greenberg Quinlan, supra note 230, at 1.
237.
238.
Id. The numbers are significantly higher in Texas with 83% of the public, 79% of lawyers,
and 50% of the justices believing that campaign contributions "significantly influence decisions."
John Jack, Corporatefinanced campaigns ... Government by the rich, for the rich? (April 2000),
available at www.afn.org/-iguanalarchives/2000_04/20000402.
Memorandum from Greenberg Quinlan, supra note 232, at 1. Surveys in individual states
239.
have yielded similar results. See generally Liptak & Roberts, supra note 230; Liptak, supra note
231; Memorandum from Coleen Danos, National Center for State Courts, Judicial Elections and
Judicial Independence Concerns: Stepping Up to the Plate (Nov. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/Publications/KISJudlnd_S98-1305_Pub.pdf.
240.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 (2002).
241.
Id. at 770.
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judges who are not targeted will be tempted to check their opinions-or
to temper them-in order to not disagree with the current bandwagon
issues.
Once a new appellate judge is elected, the judge and the court must
undergo a transition. Even experienced lawyers likely will be illequipped to manage the unique demands of appellate judging-not
merely researching and writing, but collaboratingon appellate opinions.
Courts with frequent turnover are less productive not only because of the
steep learning curve for a new judge,242 but also because of the inevitable
shift in group dynamics. 243 In addition, because appellate judging is a
collaborative function, the absence of even one judge, who is meeting
with fundraisers or on the stump, affects the overall productivity of the
court.
Judges who have faced hard-fought election battles may become
cynical and resentful; they may be forced to serve with judges who campaigned against them, reducing collegiality and creating artificial divides. 244 Finally, upheaval in a court's composition may result in instability in the law, which in turn affects the willingness to rely on precedent and overall confidence in government.
Because John Grisham writes for profit, his chosen setting for The
Appeal did not publicly finance judicial elections; nor did it impose limitations or rigorous reporting requirements on campaign contributors.
Justice Fisk was neither governed by a mandatory recusal provision nor
subject to transparent and public disciplinary proceedings for sitting on a
case in which he had made a campaign commitment. All of those possi242.
A case in point is Alabama, the state with a frequent turn-over on its supreme court.
Between 1998 and 2008, twenty different justices have served on Alabama's nine-member supreme
court. The issue of productivity surfaced in a 2006 race for the position of chiefjustice. Incumbent
Chief Justice Drayton Nabers accused Justice Tom Parker, who was vying for the position, of being
unqualified to hold the position. In support of his claim, Nabers revealed that Parker had authored
only one opinion in his first year on the bench. During the same time period, Chief Justice Parker
had authored twenty-four opinions. Two other justices who had joined the court with Parker in 2004
had authored thirty-eight and twenty-eight opinions respectively during the same time period. Justice Parker blamed his lack of productivity on the fact that he had not served as a judge before,
which classically begs the question. Dana Beyerle, New Justice Parker Slower than Colleagues,
TUSCALOOSA
NEWS,
Apr.
24,
2006,
available
at
http://www.tuscaloosanews.comarticle/20060424/NEWS/604240329.
243.
Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Chief of the Wisconsin Supreme Court since 1996 says that
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Under
Fire,
MILWAUKEE
MAGAZINE,
Dec.
1,
2005,
available at
www.milwaukeemagazine.com/currentlssue/full feature_story.asp?NewMessagelD= 13177.
Even
with consistent leadership, interpersonal squabbles can interfere with a court's productivity. The
members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court were described in the late 1980s as "claw[ing] at each
other ....
They are more preoccupied with one another than the law." In 1999, four justices accused Chief Justice Abrahamson of abusing her authority and publicly supported a contender for her
position. Id.
244.
In Wisconsin, Chief Justice Abrahamson threatened to sue four other justices, referred to
by the Wisconsin media as the "Gang of Four" when the four took steps to diminish the Chief Justice's constitutional powers. Id.
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ble reforms, untested in Grisham's fiction, might make a difference in
reality. Public finance, campaign finance, and disclosure reform would
alter the financier's lethal weapon-money. Mandatory recusal provisions, stringent disciplinary standards, and transparent disciplinary proceedings would cower even the most blatant violator.
All or some of those reform efforts might make a difference, but the
only certain solution is an appeal to the masses. Through public pressure
and backlash, the public can send a message to judges who accept large
contributions, campaign on issue-oriented platforms, use and endorse
misleading and injudicious advertisements, and refuse recusal in obvious
conflict of interest situations that such conduct by a judge will not be
tolerated. In many ways, Grisham's books-much more real that fiction-could begin the much-needed process of appealing to the public to
save the courts.

